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JUDGE JACK WEINSTEIN
AND THE WORLD OF TORT: INSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Robert L. Rabin*

INTRODUCTION
It is conventional wisdom that tort law entered a new era beginning
around 1960, emerging from a sleepy backwater area of the law in
which MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.1—decided nearly half a century earlier—remained the landmark of twentieth-century accident
law. The new era, spearheaded by the California Supreme Court
under the intellectual leadership of Justice Roger Traynor, cut across
virtually all categories of liability for unintentional injury. These developments included recognition of new and expansive duties of due
care in personal injury claims for landowner liability,2 intrafamily liability,3 professional liability,4 and stand-alone emotional distress,5
among others, and eroded existing defenses (contributory negligence
and express assumed risk)6 and immunities (governmental, in
particular).7
But the hallmark of the reconstituted law of tort was in the area of
products liability, where the California Supreme Court moved beyond
the constraints of negligence law, and in a series of influential opinions beginning with Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,8 the court
enunciated a principle of strict liability for product defects. Conventionally, Greenman is viewed as building on the foundation of Justice
Traynor’s earlier concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. My appreciation to Nora Engstrom, Cathy Sharkey, and Steve Sugarman for helpful suggestions, and to David Watnick for
valuable research assistance.
1. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
2. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
3. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971).
4. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
5. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
6. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975) (judicially adopting comparative
fault); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (redefining and limiting express assumed risk).
7. Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961).
8. 337 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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Co.,9 in which he made the case for abandoning negligence as the
standard for determining the liability of a product manufacturer for
defect-related injuries.10 And Greenman might also be viewed as a
sympathetic response to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision,
just three years earlier, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,11
similarly departing from the pathway of negligence in favor of a strict
liability principle of recovery.
These traces of the Greenman antecedents, however, slightly miss
the mark. For in his Escola concurrence, Justice Traynor still felt the
need (admittedly, perhaps as a makeweight) to argue pragmatically
that strict liability was closely akin to res ipsa negligence for a product
defect. And Henningsen was premised on warranty liability, which
Justice Traynor outright rejected as excessively formal and limiting as
a lynchpin for strict liability.
In fact, the lodestar for Greenman and the reconstituted products
liability is found not in tort law per se, but somewhat paradoxically in
the abandonment of tort law at the beginning of the twentieth century
in favor of workers’ compensation for victims of industrial injury.12 It
was here, in the domain of social welfare legislation, that the conceptual core of strict liability for product injuries—the theory of enterprise liability—was initially articulated.
Indeed, Justice Traynor’s commitment to this paradigm shift in tort
responsibility is spelled out at the very outset of his Escola concurrence. Addressing the responsibility of the defendant manufacturer
for injury from an exploding soda bottle, he begins:
Even if there is no negligence . . . public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot. Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person
injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by
the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.13
9. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
10. Id. at 443–44.
11. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
12. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Past as Prelude: The Legacy of Five Landmarks of Twentieth-Century Injury Law for the Future of Torts, in EXPLORING TORT LAW 52 (M. Stuart Madden
ed., 2005).
13. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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This two-pronged concept of enterprise liability—liability that creates
optimal incentives to safety and widely distributes the consequences
of personal injury—would serve as his guiding principle two decades
later in Greenman, when a majority on a reconstituted California Supreme Court shared his proactive philosophy of responsibility for accidental harm.
Refinements would soon follow out of necessity. Justice Traynor’s
court never clearly distinguished between manufacturing, design, and
warning defects.14 Unmoored, design defect liability would be tantamount to absolute liability, not strict liability: a manufacturer of a
high-lift loading vehicle would be responsible for injury resulting from
capsizing even if the vehicle were being driven up a mountainside.
Some limiting conception of what constituted a defect was essential.
In the negligence domain, similar refinements of the duty of due care
followed.15 Nonetheless, accident law—and especially products liability law—was now firmly anchored in the two-pronged rationale of enterprise liability.
Tort law had come to be driven by public law principles of a functional nature—in particular, tort theory characterized in regulatory
and distributional terms—in contrast to its traditional private law
character as a system of corrective justice.16 Critically, however, from
a structural perspective, the character of the new tort law remained
firmly embedded in a two-party interpersonal relationship between
plaintiff and defendant.
This structural continuity is perhaps most clearly evident in the
landmark expansions of the duty of due care in negligence cases: the
traditional interparty nexus remained a constant in Rowland v. Christian,17 Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,18 and Dillon
v. Legg.19 In some instances (e.g., Tarasoff and Dillon), these expansionary holdings raised floodgates issues. But the court addressed
14. See, e.g., Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1163 (Cal. 1972) (failing to distinguish between a manufacturing defect and a design defect in a case involving an injury to a
bread-truck driver from a defective latch holding rear-vehicle trays in place).
15. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (taking a restrictive approach to the
Dillon v. Legg bystander liability guideposts).
16. In the academic realm, this paradigm shift is best represented by Guido Calabresi in his
highly influential The Costs of Accidents and the more general attentiveness to tort in the law
and economics movement. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
17. 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (landowner’s liability to injured entrants).
18. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (therapist’s responsibility to protect third parties from serious
harm).
19. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (driver’s responsibility for stand-alone emotional distress to third
parties eye-witnessing serious personal injury).
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those issues by fashioning duty limitations in the context of traditional
two-party suits.20 Moreover, it is critical to note that duty obligations
remained the focal point in these cases; the cause in fact of harm was
rarely in dispute.
Importantly, the same observation holds for the paradigm shift in
products liability. The Greenman line of cases, defining the borders of
the new strict liability principle, arose in a two-party context, raising
questions in the first instance of whether to extend liability to those in
the vertical sales chain21 and to injured bystanders.22 Indeed, the
court’s failure to distinguish between manufacturing and design defects in cases such as Greenman, which involved a consumer personal
injury from a defective power tool, and Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson
Corp,23 is worlds apart from potential mass tort concerns. As long as
the structural focal point remained the failure to safeguard against an
undisputed injury to the immediate victim, a classic case-by-case
framework smoothly accommodated doctrinal refinement.
Even as the products liability doctrine evolved to explicitly recognize limitations on design defect liability in subsequent cases such as
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.24 and Soule v. General Motors Corp.,25
the refinements were effectuated in the traditional two-party interpersonal structure of tort claiming. Scenarios of indeterminate responsibility among joint defendants, let alone aggregation of large numbers
of claimants, was conspicuously absent.
In the midst of these developments, Jack Weinstein was appointed
to the federal bench in 1967. As I will indicate, he was in fact strongly
influenced by these proactive crosscurrents in tort law. But the cases
that would make his reputation and demonstrate his creative approach to assigning responsibility for accidental harm, while building
on this foundation of evolving tort law, were of a strikingly different
character—and they signaled a critical shift in the cutting-edge class of
injuries testing the expansive capacity of tort law. Under the nowfamiliar characterization of “mass tort,” these cases generated institutional capacity issues of a new order.
In the following section, I will offer four representative illustrations
of Judge Weinstein’s creative efforts to recast traditional tort concepts
in a fashion responsive, by his lights, to accident law claims that
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340; Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920–25.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84 (Cal. 1969).
501 P.2d 1153, 1163 (Cal. 1972); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text.
573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978) (high-lift loader injury).
882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994) (auto floorboard post-collision injury).
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pressed against the boundaries of the conventional interpersonal tort
law process. In the first of these cases, dealing with a cluster of blasting cap injuries to minors, Judge Weinstein addressed the puzzle of
the indeterminate defendant.26 In the second, war veterans’ claims
from Agent Orange exposure in Vietnam (arguably his most notable
case management effort), he wrestled with the indeterminacy of both
defendants and plaintiffs.27 In the third, the handgun cases, the mass
claims dimension so evident in Agent Orange was less salient than the
public safety perspective that animated his doctrinal creativity.28 And
finally, in the tobacco punitive damages class action, he returned to a
concern for reaching closure in a seemingly intractable public health
controversy that served as an underlying theme in Agent Orange, as
well.29
Each of these cases, in its own way, served as a vehicle for Judge
Weinstein to realign enterprise liability theory to give priority to risk
spreading over risk allocation as an expression of his distinctive commitment to redress of injury victims.30 In the final section of this Article, I will discuss how these judicial strategies mesh with Judge
Weinstein’s published efforts in the academic sphere to articulate his
vision of the role of tort law.31
II. TORT IN THE WEINSTEIN COURTROOM:
PARADIGMS, OLD AND NEW
A. Initial Foray: Blasting Caps
The imprint of these landmark California products liability decisions was central to Judge Weinstein’s initial foray into the world of
enterprise tort responsibility in 1972, just as these decisions crystallized into an identifiable foundation for a new paradigm of liability for
product injuries. In Hall v. Du Pont, a cluster of accidents resulting
from the detonation of blasting caps manufactured by six companies
injured children, providing the entrée for Judge Weinstein to spell out
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. See infra Part II.B.
28. See infra Part II.C.1.
29. See infra Part II.C.2.
30. This may seem least evident in the class action punitive damages case involving big tobacco. But as I will indicate, the closed-end single judgment remedy that Judge Weinstein proposed was in part intended to assure that serial judgment punitive damages cases did not
compromise the prospect of future compensatory damage awards for victims of tobacco-related
disease.
31. See infra Part III.
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his views on the emerging substantive law of accidental harm caused
by defective products.32
In Hall, he began with a recitation of the California Supreme
Court’s newly articulated products liability principles as applied in this
distinct injury setting.33 Duty raised no substantive obstacles for
Judge Weinstein, either under negligence or the emergent strict liability in tort, because “enterprise responsibility” for foreseeable misuse
of the blasting caps was consonant with the “two reasons for imposing
strict liability on manufacturers . . . summarized by the phrases ‘incentive’ and ‘risk allocation.’ ”34 The Traynor court’s legacy is explicit in
the opinion, as Judge Weinstein drew on and cited Escola, Greenman,
Vandermark, and Elmore.35
But Judge Weinstein moved beyond these now-baseline precepts
when he confronted the “central question . . . [of] whether the defendants can be held responsible as a group under any theory of joint liability for injuries arising out of their individual manufacture of
blasting caps.”36 This question raised an issue that could not be accommodated by simply taking another step forward in the proactive
line of California products liability decisions because the blasting cap
cases challenged the fundamental two-party, individual responsibility
nexus on which traditional tort law was premised. The blasting cap
manufacturers responsible for the particular injuries suffered by virtually all of the plaintiffs could not be individually linked. Recovery, if
allowable, would be premised instead on a concept of collective responsibility generated by collective risk creation and anchored by participation in an industry-wide safety program.
Spelling out this expanded conception of tortious responsibility,
Judge Weinstein asserted that:
[P]laintiffs can submit evidence that defendants, acting independently, adhered to an industry-wide standard or custom with regard
to the safety features of blasting caps. Regardless of whether such
evidence is sufficient to support an inference of tacit agreement, it is
still relevant to the question of joint control of risk. The dynamics
of market competition frequently result in explicit or implicit safety
standards, codes, and practices which are widely adhered to in an
entire industry. Where such standards or practices exist, the industry operates as a collective unit in the double sense of stabilizing the
production costs of safety features and in establishing an industrywide custom which influences, but does not conclusively determine,
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 368–70.
Id. at 370–71 (emphasis added).
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the applicable standard of care. . . . [W]here . . . individual defendant–manufacturers cannot be identified, the existence of industrywide standards or practices could support a finding of joint control
of risk and a shift of the burden of proving causation to the
defendants.37

Here, Judge Weinstein posited responsibility outside of the longestablished conventional approach to causation through the introduction of what came to be called “the indeterminate defendant.”38 Indeed, Judge Weinstein posited such responsibility with a flourish
beyond the named defendants, highlighting as well the salience of burden of proof considerations:
The possibility—admitted by plaintiffs—that the caps may have
come from other, unnamed sources, does not affect plaintiffs’ burden of proof. Plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence—i.e., that it is more probable than not—that the caps
involved in the accidents were the products of the named defendant–manufacturers. Plaintiffs do not have to identify which one of
the defendant–manufacturers made each injury-causing cap. To impose such a requirement would obviate the entire rule of shifting
the burden of proving causation to the defendants. It must be more
probable than not that an injury was caused by a cap made by some
one of the named defendant manufacturers, though which one is
unknown.39

Within a decade, the Hall opinion, although distinguishable on its
facts, would strongly influence the California Supreme Court’s widely
noted market share liability decision in the diethylstilbestrol (DES)
case, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,40 and the still more expansive
New York Court of Appeals approach to DES liability.41 And the

37. Id. at 374 (citations omitted).
38. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 819 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
39. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 379.
40. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). The DES cases involved a mass-produced miscarriage-preventative drug ingested by the mothers of daughters who at a later age developed various forms of
cervical cancer. Id. Complicating these cases, the mother of a DES-injured daughter in almost
all instances could not specifically identify the manufacturer whose product she had ingested.
Unlike Hall, Sindell did not involve collective activity on the part of the defendants and did
involve a far greater number of defendants. Id. Some 200 drug manufacturers marketed DES at
one point or another. Id.
41. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989). The Hymowitz court took a
dramatic step beyond Sindell by holding that even if the defendant could establish that it had not
manufactured the pills taken by the plaintiff’s mother—e.g., Rexall pills were only sold in Rexall
pharmacies, and clearly most of the DES mothers would not have been Rexall purchasers—
those defendants would nevertheless bear market share responsibility. Id. at 1078–80. This step
is tantamount to creating a no-fault compensation scheme to assess defendant responsibility,
rather than applying strict tort liability.
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Hall opinion would be of great salience for Judge Weinstein’s own
collective responsibility thinking in the Agent Orange litigation.42
It was, in fact, in the latter litigation—arguably Judge Weinstein’s
most prominent contribution to a singularly new perspective on responsibility in tort—that he closed the circle. In hindsight, the critical
dimension of Hall, involving eighteen separate accident claims, remained consonant with the traditional framework of plaintiff-side allegations of tortious responsibility. Consolidation of a judicially
manageable number of claims within a single action was not unheard
of. But Agent Orange brought the claims of thousands of Vietnam
veterans to the courthouse door, alleging a variety of harms from exposure to dioxin. The Agent Orange litigation was a game-changing
introduction of the mass tort concept, and an introduction of tort
claiming in its most perplexing setting: toxic harm exposure.
B. Addressing Mass Tort: Agent Orange
Much has been written about Agent Orange, the case in which
Judge Weinstein masterminded a $180 million settlement of a bitter
controversy that had dragged on for over six years in the halls of the
Veterans Administration and then the federal courthouse with no apparent end in sight—until Judge Weinstein emerged on the scene.
Early on, I offered my own thoughts in a review of Peter Schuck’s
excellent volume, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disasters in the
Courts.43 In a highly skeptical vein, it appeared to me, as to many
others, that the $180 million figure had “simply been picked out of the
air,” bearing no apparent relationship either to the aggregate harm
allegedly suffered by the plaintiff class or to prospective optimal deterrence of future toxic exposures.44 An expertise-based administrative no fault compensation scheme seemed a preferable institutional
approach to resolving a mass claims episode of such staggering proportions—a conclusion, it should be noted, that was not at all inconsistent with Judge Weinstein’s own thinking.45
But of course, he did not share the luxury of academic speculation.
Whatever might have been the optimal institutional forum for resolving the Agent Orange toxic exposure claims, Judge Weinstein had in42. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS
183–84 (enlarged ed. 1987).
43. Robert L. Rabin, Tort System on Trial: The Burden of Mass Toxics Litigation, 98 YALE
L.J. 813 (1989) (reviewing SCHUCK, supra note 42).
44. Id. at 819.
45. Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law’s Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3–5 (1986).
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herited the multidistrict litigation (MDL) assignment to address the
controversy as a Rule 23 class action in tort.46 And from a tort perspective, Agent Orange picks up the narrative that began in Hall. If
the blasting cap cases raised the specter of the indeterminate defendant, Agent Orange trumped them by also introducing the dilemma of
the indeterminate plaintiff.
In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein confronted the challenge of a
new era of tort claiming, for the indeterminate defendant and indeterminate plaintiff are not mirror image concerns. Where the indeterminate defendant raises the issue of proportionate risk allocation among
parties who concededly share in the collective risk creation, the indeterminate plaintiff raises the issue of probabilistic risk identification
among a class, some of whom would have suffered injury or disease
regardless of the defendants’ conduct. Clearly, these are two distinct
notions of indeterminacy, even though both are intrinsic to the tort
law requirement of cause in fact.
Judge Weinstein drew on the ideological underpinnings of Hall to
assert the collective enterprise responsibility of the eight manufacturers of Agent Orange. As in Hall, the individual responsibility of each
manufacturer was indeterminate: the Agent Orange supplied to the
Army had been pooled for purposes of foliage spraying. But it required only a modicum of creativity on the causal relationship dimension to index the responsibility of each manufacturer by volume and
toxicity. While assigning joint responsibility here was a far cry from
the errant pair of quail hunters in Summers v. Tice,47 from one vantage point, the case for shifting the burden on causal responsibility to
the defendants in Agent Orange was stronger. Only one of the hapless
hunters in fact caused the injury to the unfortunate victim in Summers; by contrast, all of the Agent Orange manufacturers caused harm
to members of the victim class (assuming, of course, a toxic exposure/
disease connection).
Indeed, the far more difficult barrier to collective responsibility of
the manufacturers was a more conventional doctrinal tort question:
whether the defendants would be shielded from responsibility by invoking the government contractor defense.48 Judge Weinstein’s engagement on this issue deserves a brief digression, for it provides a
broader insight into his contrasting perspectives on mass tort responsibility and enterprise liability tort responsibility.
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. For a discussion of Judge Weinstein’s takeover of the case, see
SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 110–11.
47. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
48. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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This sharp contrast is highlighted by fast-forwarding to the Agent
Orange postscript some twenty years after the historic settlement. In
his 1984 fairness opinion approving the settlement, Judge Weinstein
discerned sufficient ambiguity on the government contractor defense
to approve the settlement, rather than dismiss the claims outright—
particularly, ambiguity on the third prong of the defense, which he
articulated as whether the government knew as much or more than
the manufacturers regarding the toxic risks of dioxin.49 Yet two decades later, in addressing the “futures claims” by plaintiffs whose cancers had not yet ripened at the closure date of the Agent Orange
settlement fund, Judge Weinstein authored a scholarly opinion on the
government contractor defense, which dismissed the claims and asserted that from the outset it was clear the government had superior
risk information—from testing it had undertaken—than the
manufacturers.50
He then proceeded to underscore the policy reasons supporting his
dismissal of the individual opt-out claims two decades earlier, as well:
Failure to apply the government contractor defense in cases such
as this one would substantially inhibit the United States from obtaining equipment and products for its armed forces in time of
emergencies or war. Failure to afford this defense would have the
potential of enormously increasing the cost to the government of
purchasing such materials because suppliers would have to include
in the price the cost of almost unlimited and unknowable possible
liability for future tort claims. Added to costs of such prospective
suits would be the difficulty of resolving many claims through a
global settlement protecting against future claims—a problem illustrated by this very litigation and the overhanging huge numbers of
potential future like suits.51

What bears emphasis, then, is the cleavage in Judge Weinstein’s thinking between tort law as an instrument of compensation in cases of
interpersonal harm, with enterprise liability serving as the outer
bound of responsibility, and tort law as an instrumental strategy for
facilitating mass or collective relief when other institutional forums
seem to be incapacitated—which appears to have driven his earlier
refusal to invoke the government contractor defense against the plaintiff settling class in Agent Orange.
49. Id. at 795–99. The other two prongs of the defense are stated as (1) production in compliance with the government’s specifications; and (2) provision of a warning about any product
dangers that the manufacturer knew or should have known. Id. at 843; see also Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
50. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 404, 427–30, 442 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
51. Id. at 442.
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This point comes into even sharper focus in viewing the indeterminate plaintiff side of the Agent Orange case. Here, the paradox implicit in reliance on the traditional more-probable-than-not standard
of proof in toxic exposure cases had been underscored in contemporaneous scholarly academic literature.52 If one hundred victims exposed
to defendant’s toxic emissions could only establish a 30% likelihood
of injury above baseline risk, then none would in fact reach the threshold for recovery under the traditional standard. Looking to facilitate
settlement in Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein unveiled the prospect of
subclassing by disease, location, and duration of exposure, and, most
importantly, recognizing probabilistic recovery. This innovative move
was quite clearly the key to reaching the settlement—indeed, it served
as the cornerstone of the postsettlement distributional scheme.53 In
Judge Weinstein’s view, the collective claim for a responsive forum
animated a bold departure from traditional more-probable-than-not
standard of proof requirements.
As in the case of the government contractor defense, however,
Judge Weinstein made clear that this proactive strategy was grounded
in aggregate, or collective, thinking, in which a conceptual approach is
fashioned to embrace a communal harm. Once a plaintiff left the collective, via opt-out, his claim was dependent on remaining within the
parameters of traditional tort law precepts—parameters that remained faithful to a plaintiff-specific determination of cause in fact.54
Lacking any prospect of a successful evidentiary showing, Judge Weinstein proceeded to dismiss the opt-out claims.55

52. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law”
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984). For a later exposition, see Michael D.
Green, The Future of Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic Substance Causation, in EXPLORING TORT LAW, supra note 12, at 352.
53. SCHUCK, supra note 42, at 184–89, 268–72; see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND
OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 26 & 201 n.88 (1995) (pointing to the 1984 Agent Orange litigation settlement fund as an example of compensation being “divided on some statistical basis
among those injured”).
54. It can be argued that Judge Weinstein is less than entirely consistent here with his willingness to look beyond traditional tort causal requirements in the blasting cap cases. See supra
notes 36–39 and accompanying text. But in those cases, it was clear that the plaintiffs’ injuries
were a consequence of exposure to the defendants’ product; in Agent Orange, the linkage between the plaintiffs’ diseases and the product exposure was far from clear.
55. In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1260–64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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C. Conceptual Applications: Later Cases
1. On the Frontiers of Established Doctrine: The Handgun Cases
A leading illustration of Judge Weinstein addressing more conventionally structured nonaggregative tort claims—a conceptually proactive Judge Weinstein, but operating within a broadly defined domain
of enterprise liability—are his decisions in the handgun cases, Hamilton v. Accu-Tek56 and Johnson v. Bryco Arms.57 Reduced to its essentials, Hamilton involved the consolidation of a small number of violent
incidents in which either death or serious injury resulted from unidentified handguns of the type manufactured by the defendants, all constituent firms in the handgun manufacturing industry.58 The handguns
were distributed through a chain of sales to retail outlets, which in
turn were responsible for selling the guns ultimately used by the perpetrators of the violent acts.59 The precise chain of causation between
manufacture and injury in each case was not possible to trace because
the sales records and the guns themselves could not be individually
identified.60
Nonetheless, Judge Weinstein sustained jury verdicts in this diversity action while asking the Second Circuit to certify two questions to
the New York Court of Appeals.61 Hamilton is particularly notable in
the context of the two foundational Weinstein opinions discussed in
the preceding sections, Hall and Agent Orange, as a return to the
pathway forged in the former case. In Hamilton, once again there was
industry-wide activity posing a substantial risk of personal injury: the
manufacture of handguns. Yet, the setting was sharply distinct from
the aggregated claims dilemmas posed by a mass tort like that in
Agent Orange. To be sure, handgun violence can be regarded as a
social problem of first-order magnitude. But the claims arise case by
case, in contrast to the aggregate numbers, as well as the cause-in-fact
dilemmas that characterize mass toxic exposures like that in Agent
Orange.
56. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
57. 304 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
58. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 808–10.
61. Id. at 847–48. The Second Circuit granted Judge Weinstein’s request and certified two
questions: “Whether the defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
marketing and distribution of the handguns they manufacture?”; and “Whether liability in this
case may be apportioned on a market share basis, and if so, how?” Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 2000). The New York Court of Appeals took up both questions
and answered both in the negative. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1068
(N.Y. 2001).
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As such, Judge Weinstein resorted to conventional tort doctrine—in
particular, the concept of negligent entrustment—to develop the case
for a threshold duty of due care on the part of the defendants. In his
characteristically proactive mode, however, he pressed the outer
bounds of the doctrine. It is one thing to recognize a legal obligation
to a third-party victim when the defendant has carelessly enabled a
high-risk individual, such as a minor, to gain access to a firearm, or
given an intoxicated individual access to a motor vehicle. A sense of
immediacy of risk-generating conduct in these situations bridges the
gap of no direct contact with the injury victim. It is a step beyond
these scenarios to recognize entrustment liability forged through a
chain of commercial transactions between the manufacturer and vendors, let alone a straw purchaser in many instances, before the weapon
ends up in the hands of a malevolent individual.
Along with the attenuated chain of commercial transactions, the
case for responsibility turns on baseline empirical data establishing a
manufacturer’s foreseeability of reckless conduct on the part of the
ultimate vendor, the retailer, in effectuating the sale of the handgun.
In fact, the New York Court of Appeals rejected Judge Weinstein’s
expansive version of the entrustment theory, but was not entirely unsympathetic to his conceptual argument, finding the empirical evidence on suspect sales wanting.62
The attenuated chain of sales posed a second issue for which Judge
Weinstein needed to draw creatively on tort doctrine. Since the weapons in Hamilton had not been recovered, it was impossible to link respective defendant manufacturers to victims.63 Again, Judge
Weinstein was forced to bridge a gap: this time on the causal relation
issue. To do so, he relied on the newly fashioned doctrine of market
share liability brought to fruition in the DES cases, most notably
62. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1064.
The negligent entrustment doctrine might well support the extension of a duty to manufacturers to avoid selling to certain distributors in circumstances where the manufacturer knows or has reason to know those distributors are engaging in substantial sales
of guns into the gun-trafficking market on a consistent basis. Here, however, plaintiffs
did not present such evidence. Instead, they claimed that manufacturers should not
engage in certain broad categories of sales. Once again, plaintiffs’ duty calculation
comes up short. General statements about an industry are not the stuff by which a
common-law court fixes the duty point. Without a showing that specific groups of dealers play a disproportionate role in supplying the illegal gun market, the sweep of plaintiffs’ duty theory is far wider than the danger it seeks to avert.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Based on the answer to the certified question, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Weinstein’s decision. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 264 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir.
2001).
63. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808–10.
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Sindell and Hymowitz. This doctrine, as mentioned, could trace its
lineage back to Judge Weinstein’s approach in the blasting cap cases.64
But extending this freshly minted concept required another leap.
Courts had been, and remain, wary of extending market share liability
beyond the fungible drug setting of DES.65 Judge Weinstein, however, saw no reason to draw the line at DES; reminiscent of the blasting cap manufacturers, he reasoned that handgun manufacturers
collectively, even if not as coconspirators, constituted an industry producing and marketing a product without regard for the risks it posed
to innocent third parties. Once again, a more cautious New York
Court of Appeals responded negatively to this second certified question—“Whether liability in this case may be apportioned on a market
share basis, and if so, how?”66—that would have recognized a broader
applicability of market share liability-based causation.67
In Hamilton, Judge Weinstein had arguably taken tort doctrine to
creative ends with an eye on a major social issue—certainly to the
frontier of what duty and causal responsibility might dictate. As it
turned out, this was hardly the end of the handgun tort story in Judge
Weinstein’s courtroom. Just three years later, in Johnson v. Bryco
Arms, another victim of handgun violence, shot in the course of an
armed robbery, brought a claim against a handgun manufacturer,
along with wholesalers and the retail vendor who sold the weapon to a
straw purchaser—an “underground market,” as the court put it.68
This time, however, the weapon had been retrieved and the gun manufacturer identified.69 Moreover, the identified distributors in the
sales chain were empirically linked, through reliance on trace data
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) to a disproportionately high number of handgun-related deaths
64. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying discussion.
65. See, e.g., Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ohio 1987) (declining to apply marketshare liability to manufacturers of asbestos products due to the fact that
“[a]sbestos-containing products [did] not create similar risks of harm because there [were] several varieties of asbestos fibers, and they [were] used in various quantities, even in the same class
of product”).
66. Hamilton, 222 F.3d at 39.
67. Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at 1067–68.
We recognize the difficulty in proving precisely which manufacturer caused any particular plaintiff’s injuries since crime guns are often not recovered. Inability to locate
evidence, however, does not alone justify the extraordinary step of applying market
share liability. . . .
. . . [P]laintiffs here have not shown a set of compelling circumstances akin to those in
Hymowitz justifying a departure from traditional common-law principles of causation.
Id.
68. Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 F. Supp. 2d 383, 389–90 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
69. Id. at 389.
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and injuries in the New York City area70—which was not feasible in
Hamilton.
This more advantageous factual setting animated a new approach to
the issue, circumventing exclusive reliance on the problematic negligent entrustment theory and obviating the need to invoke market
share liability. Instead, Judge Weinstein pressed forward on another
frontier: the outer limits of the hoary doctrine of public nuisance.
A long but narrowly delineated tradition of public nuisance law
grounded legal responsibility in conduct involving “a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the
public comfort, or the public convenience.”71 Efforts to give this
rather fuzzy concept a modern-day public health and safety gloss have
generally been rebuffed. A widely noted illustration is the lead paint
litigation, about which the Rhode Island Supreme Court had the following to say:
Although the state asserts that the public’s right to be free from
the hazards of unabated lead had been infringed, this contention
falls far short of alleging an interference with a public right as that
term traditionally has been understood in the law of public nuisance. The state’s allegation that defendants have interfered with
the “health, safety, peace, comfort or convenience of the residents
of the [s]tate” standing alone does not constitute an allegation of
interference with a public right. The term public right is reserved
more appropriately for those indivisible resources shared by the
public at large, such as air, water, or public rights of way. Expanding the definition of public right based on the allegations in the
complaint would be antithetical to the common law and would lead
to a widespread expansion of public nuisance law that never was
intended . . . .72

Interestingly, Judge Weinstein did not directly confront the traditional constricted limits of public nuisance theory as spelled out in the
lead paint litigation. Instead, in near-ipse-dixit fashion, he leaned
heavily on the “public safety” rationale for public nuisance that he
articulated in NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc.,73 holding that “an interference with a public right occurs when the health, safety, or comfort of a
considerable number of persons in New York is endangered or injured, or the use by the public of a public place is hindered.”74 Then,
70. Id.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
72. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 453 (R.I. 2008) (citations omitted).
73. 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 448–49, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). Similarly, Acusport is a handgun public
nuisance case, but the claim was dismissed because the plaintiff organization did not meet the
requirement of a private injury distinct from an injury to the public at large. Id. at 499.
74. Id. at 448.

656

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:641

working from this baseline of substantive responsibility, he filled in
the blanks of public nuisance theory: a private injury to the plaintiff in
the case, distinct from the heightened general risks to the community
at large, and a vertical chain of obligation—no horizontal market
share issue here—established by the trace data identified with the participants in the distributional system.
If Hamilton pressed duty and causal responsibility to the outer limits of negligence theory, Bryco Arms entered a new domain of public
nuisance and once again, working within the framework of the interpersonal structure of tort law, expansively read a long-standing doctrine in notably proactive fashion.
Ultimately, Judge Weinstein’s creative gloss on a conventional doctrinal concept in Bryco Arms once again went for naught. But this
time, it is ironically because he (and the handful of other courts receptive to public nuisance theory) was arguably too persuasive. Rather
than appellate reversal, in 2005, Congress intervened at the behest of
a beleaguered handgun industry and enacted a special immunity from
tort responsibility for handgun manufacturers and distributors.75
2. Beyond the Frontier: Class-Wide Punitive Damages and a
Reprise on Mass Tort
When Judge Weinstein crafted the settlement in Agent Orange, it
gave every appearance of being the mass tort nonpareil: it involved
many thousands of potential claimants, indeterminate plaintiffs, scientific uncertainty, and more. But one distinctly troublesome question
that has come to hang like a shadow over mass tort litigation had not
yet clearly emerged at the time: how can the court address the issue of
punitive damages arising from a single course of conduct that affected
such large numbers of victims?
Along with the other aspects of mass tort litigation, mass punitive
damages claims are ill suited for resolution within the structure of
traditional interpersonal tort responsibility. The central dilemma is by
now well recognized. If punitive damages are relegated to case-bycase treatment—i.e., serial awards of punitive damages—there are
deeply rooted fairness concerns for both plaintiffs and defendants.
On the defendant’s side of the ledger, there is the basic fairness notion
that no matter how grievous one’s misconduct, there should not be
repeated punishment for a course of conduct without reference to the
sanctions already doled out. On the plaintiff’s side of the ledger, there
is the more practical concern, similarly grounded in fairness notions,
75. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
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that mass tort responsibility should as a baseline matter attend to all
of the compensatory harm done; repeated case-by-case punitive damage awards may exhaust the defendant’s resources, leaving many injury victims without recourse to compensatory awards.
In the absence of legislative resolution, the natural turn is to mass
tort aggregation. But that pathway is littered with obstacles. The tobacco litigation in Simon II,76 where Judge Weinstein would have imposed this strategic resolution, is a case in point. In the traditional tort
setting, punitive damages accompany a compensatory award to the
victimized individual plaintiff.77 But the mass tort version of this
foundation rests on a nationwide (or more modestly, statewide) class
action for compensatory damages—i.e., an aggregation of viable compensatory claims. That route has proven to be a dismal failure for
plaintiffs in the tobacco litigation: the widely noted nationwide class
action for compensatory harm in Castano v. American Tobacco Co.
was decertified by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,78 and follow-up
statewide class actions suffered a similar fate.79 Repeatedly, appellate
courts found insufficient commonality among smokers’ expectations,
awareness of risk, and diseases suffered to support class treatment.
Thus, the threshold requirement for an aggregate punitive damages
award—class-wide compensatory damages—appeared to undercut
this strategy.80
In Judge Weinstein’s courtroom, Simon I81 started down the same
route, as a case in which certification was sought for both compensa76. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
77. This is not to suggest that the compensatory award is necessarily a conventional “make
whole” assessment. Some cases involve nominal physical harm, but the conduct is viewed as
socially outrageous. See, for example, the classic case of Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872), in
which the defendant spat in the plaintiff’s face in the courthouse. The tobacco tort cases, however, like most punitive damages claims, have been grounded in a compensatory claim for disease-related out-of-pocket and nonpecuniary loss suffered by the victim.
78. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996).
79. See Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1336, 1364–75 (1999) (describing the failure of state class actions against tobacco producers in the aftermath of Castano).
80. One class action in Florida state court actually went to trial and resulted in a $145 billion
punitive damages award for the class on top of $12.7 million in compensatory damages for three
individual plaintiffs. Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1254 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
The Florida Supreme Court held that no finding of compensatory damages was required before
a jury could award damages, but that a finding of liability was a necessary predicate to an award
of punitive damages. Id. Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court overturned the punitive damages award, finding it excessive as a matter of law. Id.
81. Simon v. Philip Morris Inc. (Simon I), No. 99 CV 1988, 2000 WL 1658337 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
6, 2000). It is worth noting that Judge Weinstein referred to the Simon I class for compensatory
and punitive damages as “viable,” but did not certify the class because he determined that Simon
II would better preserve court resources; in his order denying certification for the class in Simon
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tory and punitive damages. True to his disposition in mass tort controversies, Judge Weinstein consolidated the smokers’ class action with
other third-party claims against the leading U.S. tobacco companies
for settlement discussions.
One can speculate that these discussions with the tobacco industry
went nowhere.82 But out of the process emerged a separate effort,
Simon II, in which the plaintiffs proposed a nationwide certification
solely for punitive damages.83 In response, Judge Weinstein certified
a non-opt-out limited fund class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)84 of current
and past smokers suffering from a wide array of smoking-related diseases.85 He anticipated a three-stage process, succinctly summarized
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion decertifying the
class:
In the first stage, a jury would make “a class-wide determination of
liability and estimated total value of national undifferentiated compensatory harm to all members of the class.” The sum of compensatory harm would “not be awarded but will serve as a predicate in
determining non-opt-out class punitive damages.” . . . In the second
stage, the same jury would determine whether defendants engaged
in conduct that warrants punitive damages. In the third stage, the
same jury would determine the amount of punitive damages for the
class and decide how to allocate damages on a disease-by-disease
basis. The court would then distribute sums to the class on a prorata basis by disease to class members who submit appropriate
proof. Any portion not distributed to class members would be “allocated by the court on a cy pres basis to treatment and research
organizations working in the field of each disease on advice of experts in the fields.”86

Had this process—bearing strong resemblance to the resolution of
Agent Orange—emerged from a settlement among the parties, it
might well have served as a final resolution, at least for the tobacco
wars, of then-outstanding claims for punitive damages, putting to rest
I, he anticipated that Simon II would allow for a compensatory damages class to be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3). Id.
82. The tobacco industry has been resolutely opposed to settling either individual or class tort
cases from the 1950s onward. See generally Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992); Robert L. Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies:
Past Efficacy and Future Promise, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1721, 1741–44 (2008) [hereinafter Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies].
83. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
85. Simon II, 211 F.R.D. at 96–97.
86. In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Simon
II, 211 F.R.D. at 100).
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the fairness issues inherent in serial punitive damages litigation.87 But
as a strategy for boldly recasting punitive damages in tort law, it
clashed in fundamental ways with the interpersonal structure of determining such awards.
Stage one would have required open-ended speculation, in hypothetical terms, regarding the number and character of colorable compensatory claims. At the same time, it offended emerging
constitutional due process doctrine—BMW v. Gore,88 soon to be followed by State Farm v. Campbell89 and Philip Morris v. Williams90—in
which the United States Supreme Court sought to cabin punitive
awards to conduct directed at litigants whose claims were before the
court, refusing to recognize course-of-conduct harm beyond the immediate parties.91 And finally, Judge Weinstein’s non-opt-out proviso
challenged yet another Supreme Court directive, found in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard,92 where the Court had taken a restrictive view of the
scope of limited fund class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
On the latter score, there was a radical disjuncture between Judge
Weinstein’s conception of the limited fund threshold for applicability
of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) and the more conventional conception spelled out
in Ortiz. Put simply, Ortiz envisioned the trigger for limited fund class
certification as prospective mass tort claims that would threaten to
deplete the limited pool of assets available to discharge the company’s
prospective legal liability, thereby generating later-arising claims for
which no compensation would be available. By contrast, Judge Weinstein defined the “limited fund” as an upper limit on aggregate punitive damages necessitated by the loosely defined constitutional due
process ratio between compensatory and punitive damages articulated
in Gore.93
87. Of course, “futures cases”—those arising out of tobacco-related harm not yet realized at
the point of decision—might have resurrected the issue. But this is premised on highly speculative claims of continuing clandestine deceptive practices by the defendants.
88. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
89. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
90. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
91. Simon II, 407 F.3d at 138–39. Confusingly, the Williams court held that a jury might consider harm inflicted on others for purposes of determining reprehensibility of the defendant’s
conduct. Williams, 549 U.S. at 356–57. But at the same time, a jury could not punish a defendant for harm to others. Id. The Second Circuit feared that without a nonhypothetical finding of
compensatory damages, the punitive award could not be measured for proportionality to the
cognizable harm suffered—proportionality serving as another guidepost to satisfying constitutional due process requisites. Simon II, 407 F.3d at 138.
92. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
93. See supra note 91 for reference to the proportionality guidepost.
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In short, Judge Weinstein’s trigger for imposing limited fund treatment was a ratio-sensitive ceiling on aggregate punitive damages,
which could only be effectuated, as he saw it, by avoiding virtually
limitless serial punitive damages claims through aggregate class disposition, whereas Ortiz had defined the trigger as a ceiling on available
corporate assets. In this regard, it is critical to note that had Judge
Weinstein adopted the Ortiz mandate, the case for nationwide class
certification against the tobacco industry would have immediately collapsed: there was no basis for predicting that the cash-rich tobacco
industry would be threatened with insolvency from continuing serial
liability for punitive damages.94
The shaky foundation on which limited fund treatment rested in Simon II only served to highlight the still more fundamental
two-pronged departure from the conventional common law approach
to punitive damages. The limited fund ceiling propounded by Judge
Weinstein was ungrounded in recognized compensatory damage
claims, or indeed, even in empirically based speculation as to the aggregate figure. Correlatively, it was not limited to course of conduct
aimed exclusively at identifiable parties to the litigation.
In this latter regard, one sees the ill fit between the traditional interpersonal tort claims structure and the conception Judge Weinstein had
for a national resolution. But how could it be otherwise? How could
a two-party tort process, featuring, as a focal point, individualized recompense for a “deserving” plaintiff, be squared with Judge Weinstein’s aspiration to overcome the intrinsic incapacity for resolving the
dilemma posed by mass course-of-conduct harm?
Interestingly, had these stage one barriers been surmountable,
Judge Weinstein’s creative mastery in reformulating conventional tort
doctrine could have been made into a perfectly respectable case for
proceeding as he envisioned at stages two and three. Essentially,
stage two would have replicated the narrative of industry deceit and
misrepresentation through the mid-1990s that has been the standard
fare of every individual fraudulent conduct tort claim against the tobacco companies during the past twenty years.95 Because those industry advertising and promotion stratagems, as well as the suppression
of scientific findings, were targeted at smokers and potential smokers
at large, class-wide treatment of the evidence seems uncontroversial—
94. Plaintiffs in the tobacco tort litigation have, in fact, realized successful outcomes in only a
relatively modest number of cases. Robert L. Rabin, Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in
Tobacco-Related Disease, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 507, 523–24 (2014).
95. See Rabin, Tobacco Control Strategies, supra note 82, at 1732–35, 1741–44.
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commonality of claims based on the narrative of malfeasance would
have been readily established.
Stage three would have been devoted to two distinct allocational
issues. To be sure, Judge Weinstein’s anticipated pro rata distribution
of damages on a disease-by-disease basis is in the creative settlement
mode of Agent Orange, but in the present context outside the flexible
framework of a settlement agreement. However, it is critical to focus
on the fact that distribution here would have entailed punitive damages. As a consequence, the due process concerns raised by a subcategory treatment of compensatory damage claims seem inapplicable
to the setting, because the focus is on the defendant’s wrongdoing, not
on the compensatory needs of individual victims.
This, in turn, makes Judge Weinstein’s related intention to distribute some portion of the award to treatment and research programs
even less controversial. Once again, individual claims to recompense
from a punitive damage award are attenuated: the sanctions are aimed
at accounting for socially deleterious conduct, not at providing add-on
compensation for the victim’s injuries.96 Indeed, the cy pres strategy
envisioned by Judge Weinstein has been employed both in the legislative and judicial domain in other cases.97
It is beyond the scope of this paper to trace comprehensively the
many byways addressed by Judge Weinstein in the domain of tort,
which might be characterized as “Tort Law Unbound,” pressing tort
law to the limits of its capacity for responsively addressing grievances
when the essential character of the claim falls within the recognized
boundaries of the tort process, and in another vein, administering tort
as an institutional forum of last resort in controversies beyond the ken
of the conventional tort process. I have simply attempted to be
illustrative.98
96. Another way of putting this point is that plaintiffs serve, in essence, as private attorneys
general in punitive damages cases, rather than as continuing claimants for redress of individualized harm.
97. See Dardinger v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 781 N.E.2d 121, 145–46 (Ohio 2002)
(relying on common law authority to allocate partially to a fund); see also Catherine M. Sharkey,
Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 414–28 (2003) (describing state statutes directing a portion of a punitive damages award to a “public” purpose).
98. I have also attempted to select illustrative cases in which the dominant focus is on tort
issues. In fact, Judge Weinstein’s work product in the array of tort-related cases in which he has
crafted notable opinions have in most instances involved an inextricable mix of tort and civil
procedure issues. See supra Part II. Judge Weinstein’s handling of those civil procedure dimensions of his work on the bench is discussed in other contributions to this symposium. See Howard M. Erichson, Judge Jack Weinstein and the Allure of Antiproceduralism, 64 DEPAUL L. REV.
393 (2015); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Participation and Procedure, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 513
(2015); David Marcus, Two Models of the Civil Litigant, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 537 (2015); Linda S.
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Instead, I will turn briefly to comment on Judge Weinstein outside
the courtroom, where perhaps unsurprisingly, given his distinguished
academic career, he has contributed through scholarship to offering a
broader perspective on his conception of tort law as a forum for
resolving accidental harm controversies.99
III. TORT SCHOLARSHIP: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
As might be expected of a judicial figure who has achieved such
prominence, and particularly one with an academic bent, Judge Weinstein has taken numerous opportunities to reflect in writing on tort
law. Many of his publications are occasional pieces—mere fragmentary reflections.100 But not all. Some thirty years ago, he published an
article entitled Preliminary Reflections on the Law’s Reaction to Disasters,101 offering his comprehensive view of tort from a comparative
institutional perspective—a perspective reaffirmed a decade later in
his volume Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation.102 The article
provides an invaluable backdrop against which to read his leading judicial opinions.
As a starting point, it is notable that Judge Weinstein’s central preoccupation in addressing accidental harm issues from an intellectual
perspective is channeled to mass tort cases, as the title of his aforementioned book indicates. Indeed, on many occasions, almost as an
aside, Judge Weinstein expresses relative satisfaction with tort law as a
process for resolving traditional interpersonal claims—or, for that
matter, what might be viewed as mass tort claims such as airline
Mullenix, Competing Values: Preserving Litigant Autonomy in an Age of Collective Redress, 64
DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2015).
99. For biographical treatment of Judge Weinstein, see JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON
THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN (2011).
100. E.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451 (2012); Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on Administration of Complex Litigations, CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1 (2009), available at
www.cardozolawreview.com/de-novo-2009.html; Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 165 (2001); Jack B. Weinstein,
Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational World Communicating by Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145 (2001); Jack B. Weinstein, The Restatement of
Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1439 (2001) [hereinafter Weinstein, The Restatement and
the Courts]; Jack B. Weinstein, Notes for a Discussion of Mass Tort Cases and Class Actions, 63
BROOK. L. REV. 581 (1997); Jack B. Weinstein, An Introduction to Who’s Who in Mass Toxic
Torts, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive Problems
in Complex Litigation Arising from Disasters, 5 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1988); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389 (1985).
101. Weinstein, supra note 45.
102. WEINSTEIN, supra note 53, at 15–37 (covering “The Law’s Reaction to Disasters”); see
also Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469 (1994).
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crashes, where aggregation of like cases transfigures the multiplicity of
claims into what is tantamount to an interpersonal tort structure.103
How is the system to address what this modern age has wrought?
With advances in technology, science, and industrial productivity, accidental harm is generated not only on a massive scale but also, in
many instances, with an insidious newly recognized dimension: toxic
exposure. Here one finds resonances in his judicial opinions. The
toxic exposure element is critical to reassessing the institutional capacity of traditional tort law. As long as relatively large numbers of injury victims suffer similar injuries under roughly similar
circumstances—ranging from airline crashes to blasting cap injuries—
tort law maintains sufficient flexibility to satisfy traditional goals of
corrective justice and welfare aims. But once diversity of mass claims,
both in terms of exposure and scientific uncertainty are introduced—
characteristic of mass toxic incidents—conventional tort processing is
radically compromised.104
Surprisingly perhaps, in view of the widespread notion that Judge
Weinstein is the prototypical example of a judge bent on establishing
the hegemony of tort, he in fact subscribes to a strikingly modest institutional role for courts to play in addressing the dilemmas of accidental harm in the context of mass tort incidents. In these scenarios,
Judge Weinstein’s model for institutional responsiveness would not
rely on tort in the first instance. Instead, in recognition of the inevitability of such low incidence/high magnitude risks coming to fruition,
he would attend to the baseline needs of the randomly injured vic103. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 53, at 16–17, 181 n.11 (describing similar “cataclysmic” events
that can be “handled relatively effectively by our tort system” such as gas leaks, chemical explosions, the Kansas City Skywalk collapse, and the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire that killed 164
people in 1977); see also Weinstein, supra note 45, at 6–8 (covering the same material).
104. Judge Weinstein sorts disasters into four different types: “Clear Cause—Single Event—
Injuries Proximate in Time and Space” (the collapse of two walkways at the Hyatt Regency
Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, that killed 113 people in 1981), “Clear Cause—Multiple
Events—Injuries Nonproximate in Place” (the Dalkon Shield), “Unclear Cause—Multiple
Events—Injuries Nonproximate in Time and Place” (claims for injuries from radiation released
by American military nuclear testing), and “Unclear Cause—Multiple Events—Injuries Nonproximate in Time and Place—Identities of Both Producers and Injured Unclear” (DES). WEINSTEIN, supra note 53, at 16–19, 181 n.11, 183 n.21. For each type, Judge Weinstein acknowledges
that there are obstacles to recovery, but does not seem to consider any type uniformly unsuited
to adjudication as a mass tort. Id. at 16–19.
Under certain circumstances, one can discern that the mass scale of class litigation itself would
suffice to overtax traditional tort, irrespective of the distinct causal complexities introduced by
toxic exposure. Presumably, in a 9/11-scale disaster, even in the absence of second-order toxic
exposures, the sheer magnitude and urgency of personal injury claims, in the context of traditional doctrinal uncertainty, would overtax the capacity of tort law, from Weinstein’s perspective. From another vantage point, mass punitive damages claims, discussed supra Part II.C.2.,
similarly challenge traditional tort system capacity.
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tims—medical and rehabilitative expenses and lost income—in the
same fashion as those similarly disabled when disaster strikes unexpectedly from natural causes in everyday life: through first-party government insurance.105 Because he views these injuries as the
inevitable by-product of industrial progress—rather than from the
conventional tort perspective of “deserving victim” and “wrongful
malefactor”—he consistently deprecates both punitive damages and
make-whole pain and suffering awards.106
But Judge Weinstein, ever the realist, recognizes that first-party
coverage for death and disability, no matter the source, is not a realistic proposition in the political culture of this country. As a modified
strategic approach, he endorses a no fault workers’ compensation
model, devoid of preoccupation with wrongdoing.107 Indeed, he goes
so far as to suggest that tort might well have been replaced by workers’ compensation in the most vexing of twentieth-century mass torts,
asbestos: “Were workers’ compensation legislation modernized, workers injured by products such as asbestos would collect only workers’
compensation, albeit at more realistic payment levels. Third-party
suits against asbestos suppliers could then be eliminated without
shocking our sense of fairness.”108
At the same time, he is not indifferent to either conscious wrongdoing or general deterrence. But in his idealized system, these objectives
would be achieved by criminal and regulatory penalties, along with
105. WEINSTEIN, supra note 53, at 4–5 (considering a national health care system and an expansion of Social Security Disability as suitable replacements for judicial treatment, and envisioning that individuals could purchase extra coverage or negotiate for it with their employers).
106. Id. at 5, 22.
Pain and suffering will probably not be directly compensated [in a government insurance scheme]. These elements can, unfortunately, be deemed the normal aspects of life
in our mass technological society . . . . On the whole, speaking only of health, the
steady increase in life expectancy in our nation suggests that the benefits of mass technology and chemistry far outweigh the risks.
....
. . . Essentially, a workers’ compensation-like scheme crafted for the individual case
is necessary. Punitive damages and large claims of pain and suffering are probably
impractical and undesirable.
Id. This proposed model of social welfare necessarily sacrifices a systemic focus on individual
justice, which Judge Weinstein recognizes as a priority worth protecting. Id. at 1–3.
107. Id. at 22 (“The workers’ compensation framework can be equitable because in return for
forgoing large recoveries, workers are assured compensation even when there is insufficient
proof of specific causation—provided that the plan takes account of such factors as inflation and
new hazards.”).
108. Id. at 28. Moreover, were it realistic, Judge Weinstein seems attracted to universal nofault coverage along the lines of the New Zealand comprehensive approach. See id.
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prospective governmental subrogation claims against specific injurygenerating firms.109
Idealization aside, in the realm of interpersonal accident law, compensation remains front and center for Judge Weinstein: “Primarily
through tort law the courts compensate those injured by others. Secondary aspects of our work such as deterrence or forcing tortfeasors
to pay the full social costs of their activities are minor and
collateral.”110
In a distinctly second-best world, where no fault compensation for
mass injury victims is not forthcoming and regulatory initiatives serve
an exclusively deterrent function, Judge Weinstein similarly views the
first-order business of tort law as providing for the basic pecuniary
needs of injury victims as best it can, by restructuring both procedural
strategies (e.g., liberalizing aggregation; promoting mass settlement)
and remedial measures (e.g., extending nonfault responsibility; adopting probabilistic causal attribution; scheduling damages), along with a
host of jurisdictional and choice of law strategies aimed at creating a
single decision-making forum that can attend to collective needs—frequently through collective responsibility.111
These strategies are delineated in his 1986 article Preliminary Reflections on the Law’s Reaction to Disasters.112 Much of this thinking,
it seems fair to say, grew out of Judge Weinstein’s Agent Orange experience. Some two decades later, drawing on a succession of mass tort
case management responsibilities in the ensuing years, he offered further reflections on the advantages of aggregation of claims:
First is an available substantive advantage to plaintiffs suing in a
group or through class consolidation. If no one person can show by
a preponderance of evidence that he was injured by a toxic substance or false claim, but demographics, epidemiology, and statistics
can demonstrate that some large number—say thirty percent—were
injured by the substance and seventy percent by endogenous factors, the parties responsible should be ordered to pay the thirty percent (which they caused) of the damage to be divided among the
whole class. In some cases the courts must use a “fluid recovery,” as
109. Id. at 5, 166, 170–71. For an earlier scholarly proposal along these lines, see Marc A.
Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA.
L. REV. 774 (1967).
110. Weinstein, The Restatement and the Courts, supra note 100, at 1439.
111. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 53, at 20–23 (identifying these attributes as “Desirable Conditions for Disaster Management by Courts”). At the same time, Judge Weinstein maintains that
any system for compensating victims of mass harms should endeavor to protect “the sense of
individual justice and control of their case by parties,” even if by, among other things, enabling
complaints to be heard by phone or mail. Id. at 1–3, 9–14, 167–71.
112. Weinstein, supra note 45, at 16–21.
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in the nuclear plant litigation I conducted involving Long Island
where the recovery against the Long Island Lighting Company had
to be divided among past and present ratepayers, with some receiving less and some more than their equitable share because this was
the only practicable way to divide the appropriate recovery.
Second, the procedural advantages by suing in a class or in consolidated actions are substantial to injured plaintiffs: jurisdiction in
one court may be more easily obtained; costs of discovery, retention
of experts, legal research and legal fees can be substantially reduced; and small consolidated claims that would not otherwise be
viable can support a suit. Defendants can obtain peace against future claims so they can get on with their business.113

From an institutional perspective, Judge Weinstein’s vision of the mass
tort claims adjudicator essentially frames the judge as a national no
fault administrator in a world where true national no fault is simply
off the table as a politically viable proposition. This vision runs as a
leit motif from Agent Orange through landmark decisions of his that
are beyond the scope of my present coverage.114
At its core, the tobacco epidemic—assignable to an industry clearly
at fault—revealed a similar disjuncture, from Judge Weinstein’s perspective, between the procedural underpinnings of traditional tort
law, and the mass claims of diseased smokers. In his light cigarette
decision, he once again turned to consolidation as a counter to caseby-case replaying of the narrative of industry irresponsibility against a
backdrop of defenses turning on particularized reliance.115 And to
Judge Weinstein, it was just such traditional fealty to individualized
113. Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 172–74 (2008) (footnotes
omitted).
114. See, e.g., Schwab v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (certifying a class action Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against tobacco companies for fraudulently inflating the price of “light” cigarettes by falsely claiming they
were a safer product, and permitting the plaintiffs to show reliance by generalized statistical
proof), rev’d sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008); In re
Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (imposing a limit on attorney fees
and exercising other oversight controls on a privately negotiated settlement, which Judge Weinstein declared a “quasi-class action,” though no class certification had been sought); In re Breast
Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying the defendants’ summary judgment motion for systemic disease claims even though the plaintiffs had yet to raise sufficient
proof of causation, and allowing the plaintiffs to proceed on their claims for local injuries by
severance from claims regarding systemic diseases); In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that DES manufacturers would be severally liable for the plaintiffs’
injuries according to national market share at the time of injury, and that New York jurisdiction
could be exercised over DES manufacturers that never distributed in the New York market); In
re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (certifying a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) limited fund class to benefit from a settlement trust created by asbestos manufacturers’ bankruptcy plan), rev’d, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
115. Schwab, 449 F. Supp. at 1046, 1099, 1248.
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treatment of compensatory claims that stood as an obstacle to an efficient collective determination of punitive damages, as well.116
Once again, regulatory action that might have appropriately sidestepped the need for judicial intervention was wanting. As he saw it, a
notable institutional vacuum called for unprecedented judicial creativity in the tort forum. Small wonder, then, that Judge Weinstein has
been an agent provocateur both of academic critics and of appellate
judges assigned to review his decisions.

116. In the latter case, of course, Judge Weinstein was not motivated to aggregate in order to
meet the basic pecuniary needs of the victim class. Still, as mentioned earlier, even in this punitive mode, his intent was to set aside a substantial portion of the award for treatment and research programs. In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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